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IV. PROTECTION OF THE PRESS FROM PRIOR
RESTRAINT AND HARASSMENT UNDER
LIBEL LAWS
STANLEY GODOFSKY*
We all know that the media occupies a unique and vital role in
the functioning of our democratic society. In a very real sense, they are
the ombudsmen of our system. Throughout the history of the republic,
our newspapers and, more recently, other media have played a vital
role in exposing governmental incompetence, venality and corrup-
tion, of which the latest dramatic example is Watergate. What is
perhaps not fully realized is the fact that our founding fathers recog-
nized the unique role which our press was destined to play. James
Madison, one of the leading spirits in the formulation of the first
amendment, had this to say:
In every state, probably, in the union, the press has exerted a
freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men
of every description which has not been confined to the strict
limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the
press has stood; on this footing it yet stands. .... I
Perhaps you can write James Madison off as revolutionary. After
all, he was. But recognition of the role of the media in our society
extends across the entire political spectrum. It has been observed that
the newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country,
it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light
on the public and business affairs of the nation than any
other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovern-
ment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity af-
forded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than
with grave concern.
2
Those words were written not by Mr. Justice Black, or Mr.
Justice Douglas, or Mr. Justice Brennan. They were written by none
other than Mr. Justice Sutherland in the year 1936.
And yet, despite this general recognition of the unique function
which our constitution assigns to the press, virtually nothing was done
until about ten years ago to provide a legal framework which would
protect the press from the harassment of libel suits in carrying out its
role.
If this were 1963 and I were asked to summarize the law of libel
as it stood in the United States, I would have told you that the
* Member of the New York Bar; Partner in the firm of Rogers & Wells, New York, New
York.
1. Quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
2. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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Supreme Court said not once, but six or seven times, that libel fell
outside the protection of the first amendment. 3 Thus, there was no
federal constitutional protection afforded the media in dealing with
libel suits. There was some limited protection available under state
law for fair comment, so long as the defendant could prove that the
facts printed were true, as well as the usual qualified privileges avail-
able for reports of judicial, legislative and executive proceedings. Some
states also afforded qualified protection where the libel related to
public officials. But in general, any statement which subjected a
person to ridicule and contempt could be the subject of a libel suit,
irrespective of the plaintiff's status as a public official or a public
figure, or the importance of the matter being discussed.
The plaintiff in such a case did not have to prove negligence or
any other dereliction; liability was absolute. It was not a defense to
show that the defendant was merely repeating a charge that had been
made by someone else. The plaintiff did not even have to show that
the libelous utterance wag false. The falsity of the statement was
presumed. For the most part, truth was a defense, but it had to be
pleaded and proven by the defendant. Even this defense was taken
away in some jurisdictions if malice, meaning ill will or spite, could be
established.
It had even been held that a state could enact a group libel law
which would impose criminal penalties on those who libeled groups
which the legislature wanted to protect. 4 This was a perfectly under-
standable ruling from a humanitarian point of view when applied to
minority groups such as blacks, but one which could certainly be used
at a later date to punish the media for printing material deemed
offensive to the majority. In fact, the case which started the revolution
in the modern law of libel grew out of just such a situation.
It seems like ancient history, but it was only twenty years ago that
the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.5 Following
that decision, there was a campaign of massive resistance to public
school integration in the South. At the same time, blacks throughout
the South began to assert themselves in ways which had been unheard
of since Reconstruction. New leaders began to emerge among the black
community. The most prominent of these was Martin Luther King, Jr.
By the late 1950's, we were in the midst of a massive racial confronta-
tion. There were attempts to suppress the NAACP; threats to close
down the public schools; bus desegregation controversies in Montgom-
ery and Birmingham; the issuance of court injunctions; the redistrict-
ing of Tuskegee; and many other events, all of which received exten-
sive coverage in the news media.
3. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,
365 U.S. 43 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Somewhere along the line, a number of public officials in
Alabama decided that one way to deal with this highly visible and
highly unfavorable coverage was to invoke the libel laws. Seven libel
suits were commenced in Alabama against the New York Times on
the basis of a single article written by Harrison Salisbury. At least five
members of Alabama officialdom filed libel suits against CBS.
Five officials and former officials brought suit against the New
York Times and four of Martin Luther King's lieutenants on the
basis of a full-page advertisement which had been run in the New
York Times. The ad had been sponsored by some of the most promi-
nent persons in America, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Norman
Thomas and a raft of entertainment personalties. One of the cases
arising out of the ad was New York Times v. Sullivan. 6
The ad in question was an appeal for funds for three purposes: (1)
to help embattled black students, (2) to assist in their struggle for the
right to vote, and (3) to help Martin Luther King defend himself
against charges of perjury in connection with the filing of his Alabama
state income tax returns. The charge against King was a serious
criminal charge and carried a maximum penalty of ten years in jail.
This was not Martin Luther King's first brush with the law in
Alabama. In 1956, he was indicted and convicted of violating an
Alabama criminal boycott statute because of his activities involving
desegregation of the Montgomery Bus Lines. Again in 1956, he was
arrested for speeding and, in 1958, for loitering.
Commissioner Sullivan filed his complaint 21 days after the publi-
cation of the advertisement in question. At the time he filed, he had
been police commissioner for some seven months. The ad, without
identifying or naming any particular individual, or focusing on any
particular time, referred to incidents which had occurred in Montgom-
ery, Orangeburg, Atlanta, Nashville, Savannah, Greensboro, Mem-
phis, Richmond, Charleston and Tallahassee.
Commissioner Sullivan took umbrage at only two paragraphs in
the ad. He admitted at the trial that not all of the statements, even in
those two paragraphs, could reasonably be read as relating to him, and
the Supreme Court specifically found7 that none of the statements related
to him.
Nevertheless, the jury awarded him $500,000 in damages. It
found not only against the New York Times which had published the
advertisement in question, but also against King's lieutenants who
were listed as sponsors of the ad.
In the Supreme Court it would have been quite sufficient for the
Court to have thrown the case out on the ground that the advertise-
ment could not reasonably be read as relating to Commissioner Sulli-
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 288.
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van. But the Court, apparently convinced by the background of the
case that the libel laws could be used as instruments of oppression,
went further. The Court superimposed on the state libel laws a con-
stitutional first and fourteenth amendment rule which provided, in
substance, that an elected public official could not recover damages in
a libel suit without establishing that the defendant had published a
false and defamatory statement with what the Court called actual
malice. The Court defined actual malice to mean either that the
defendant knew the statement was false when he published it, or the
defendant published the statement with reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity.
The Supreme Court soon made it clear that by reckless disregard,
it meant publication with a high degree of awareness of probable
falsity. So, for public officials, at least, the rule was established that a
plaintiff could not recover unless he could show not only that the
statement complained of was false, but also that the defendant knew it
was false, or published it with a high degree of awareness that it was
probably false.
The New York Times doctrine was soon expanded to cover candi-
dates for public office and public figures generally. 8 It was further
expanded to cover criminal as well as civil libel cases, 9 and cases
arising out of violations of so-called rights of privacy. 10
The courts also began to hold that a plaintiff within the ambit of
the New York Times v. Sullivan rule was required to prove falsity, not
by a preponderance of the evidence, the normal rule in civil cases, but
by evidence of convincing clarity."'
A number of courts concluded that the public policy behind the
first amendment protection turned, not so much on the identity of the
individual who claimed to be defamed, but upon the importance of the
issue under discussion. These courts logically extended the ambit of
the New York Times rule to all matters of public importance and to
individuals, however private or lowly their station in life, who, inten-
tionally or otherwise, found themselves embroiled in a public con-
troversy.
The courts also recognized that in the hurly-burly of meeting
deadlines, and sometimes even with all the time in the world, mistakes
would inevitably occur and that the failure to afford a judicial remedy
for such mistakes was part of the price which a victim would inevita-
bly have to pay if the press were to be left free from the constant threat
of libel judgments.
8. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
10. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
11. See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 722-23 (1970) (Bell, J. concurring), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972). New York Times itself seems to require such a standard on the issue of
actual malice.
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The courts even went so far as to hold that a failure to investigate
before publishing could not be considered evidence of actual malice,' z
and that a denial of wrongdoing by the plaintiff before a story was
published was not sufficient to establish "actual malice.' 3 Thus a
defendant who failed to conduct an investigation or declined to credit
a plaintiff's denial could be held responsible only if he actually enter-
tained serious doubts about the truth of the defamatory statement at
the time it was published.
The courts have also recognized that the expense of defending a
libel suit, even if ultimately successful, could inhibit a free press. For
this reason, unlike the normal civil case, summary judgments and
interlocutory appeals are favored in cases involving a New York Times
v. Sullivan issue. It is even arguable that states have a constitutional
duty to make such summary procedures available, even though they
are not normally available under the state's procedural rules.
14
Yet almost from the very beginning there were those on the
Supreme Court and elsewhere who were concerned with a competing
consideration. A libel suit, after all, is a recognized method for the
vindication of one's reputation. By way of historical aside, it is in-
teresting to recall that the libel laws were developed, in part, because
they are a more civilized, and less dangerous, way of vindicating one's
honor than duels.'
5
While punitive and even general damages are not necessarily
needed for purposes of vindication, most of us would recognize that
there are instances where a person falsely accused of misconduct can
suffer real damage, which cannot always be measured in dollars. We
must also recognize that even among the most prominent, a denial of
wrongdoing rarely catches up completely with the original charge.
Those who believe with Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Doug-
las, that the first amendment precludes the application of libel laws to
the media, would argue that these considerations must give way to the
clear and unambiguous command of the first amendment. Others
would argue that a deliberate liar ought not to be protected from the
payment of damages by the first or any other amendment and, beyond
that, a private individual who is unwillingly dragged into the middle
of something-even something in which the public has an interest-is
12. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
13. New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
14. At this point Mr. Godofsky suggested that newspapers seriously consider obtaining
low-deductible liability insurance covering legal expenses. Panelist Dan Paul, a prominent Miami
attorney who represented the Miami Herald in the Tornillo case, took issue with Mr. Godofsky's
suggestion. It was Mr. Paul's position that having an insurance company as co-defendant would
be disadvantageous to the newspaper. He expressed concern that plaintiff's counsel could point
out to a jury that newspapers regularly make mistakes and that is why the insurance company
sits with the defendant: to pay for those mistakes. Mr. Paul's suggestion was for newspapers to
establish some type of self-insurance plan, involving a pooling of resources and risks.
15. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 397 U.S. 64 (1964).
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entitled to an opportunity to vindicate his good name, particularly if
the news media has been careless.
The issue of whether the "actual malice" rule of New York Times
v. Sullivan would apply to all individuals who unwillingly find them-
selves involved in a matter which is newsworthy was presented to the
Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. 16 A plurality there held
that it did; but the impact of that decision was to be shortlived.
In June of 1974, the Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 17 which, at first blush, appears to be a turning back. But
closer examination is warranted. Gertz was a lawyer of some promi-
nence in Chicago who found himself the subject of an attack by a
magazine published for the John Birch Society. The. nub of the libel
was an accusation that Gertz was a "communist-fronter" and that he
had participated in a "frameup" of a policeman as part of a large
communist conspiracy. The Supreme Court held that the New York
Times doctrine did not apply to Gertz, whom the Court held to be
neither a public official nor a public figure. The Court did hold,
however, that the old rule of absolute liability could not constitution-
ally be applied because the accusation against Gertz arose out of a
matter of public interest. The Court further held that the State of
Illinois, under whose law the action had been brought, could develop
any standard of liability in such a situation other than absolute liabili-
ty. It also held that, in a case such as this, a plaintiff could not collect
punitive damages or general damages without a showing of actual
malice in the New York Times v. Sullivan sense. The Court did say
that such a plaintiff could collect for what it called "actual injury," but
the opinion also made it clear that actual injury is not limited to actual
out-of-pocket losses. It is pretty hard to see how the Supreme Court's
"actual injury" differs materially from the old concept of "general
damages." Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that damages are no
longer presumed, but must be proven. Just what this means in the case
of damages which are not out-of-pocket damages, the Supreme Court
gingerly left for lower courts to develop.
The Gertz case raises a number of fascinating questions. The
Court said, for example, that the New York Times rule applied not
only to an individual who achieves such pervasive fame that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes, but also to a person who
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. I can
see that in the next few years many cases will turn on the question of
whether a private individual is a public figure for all or some purposes;
but I am not at all certain what tests are going to be used to determine
at what point a private individual becomes a public figure; or how the
16. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
17. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), noted in 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 367 (1975).
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new rule differs significantly from the old rule that one who voluntar-
ily injects himself into the vortex of a public controversy, or is in-
volved in a matter of public importance, falls within the ambit of New
York Times v. Sullivan.
Perhaps the most intriguing questions of all involve absolute
liability; as I indicated earlier, the almost universal rule in libel prior
to New York Times was absolute liability-liability without fault. In New
York Times, the Supreme Court superimposed on this rule a constitu-
tional limitation which could readily be applied as a limitation on state
law with respect to those cases falling within its parameters. But what do
you do in Gertz type cases? The Supreme Court says the old rule of
absolute liability is unconstitutional and that the states are free to adopt
any other rule. Does this mean that substantially all state libel laws are
now unconstitutional and can only be cured by acts of the legislature?
Can a court preserve the constitutionality of state libel laws by develop-
ing some judge-made limitations, and, if so, what limitation? Will it be
the New York Times standard? Will it be some lesser standard? Can it be
done retroactively? And what about those states which have codified
their laws, so that the libel law now in force is purely statutory? And what
about the Virgin Islands where the law is legislatively declared to be that
enunciated by the Restatement promulgated by the American Law
Institute? Since we have a case currently pending in the Virgin Islands
which raises this very issue, I do not think it appropriate to say any more
about that situation, but it certainly is intriguing.
One response to all of this, of course, has been the suggestion that
states adopt so-called "right of reply" statutes similar to those adopted
many years ago in Florida. The Florida statute, of course, was held
unconstitutional just recently in the Tornillo"8 case. Tornillo will be
the subject of a discussion this afternoon by Henry Geller 19 and I do
not want to preempt any of his material. Here, it is enough to say that
the Supreme Court held that the first amendment prohibits the gov-
ernment from telling the newspapers, at least, what they must publish.
Which brings us to the other side of the coin, can the government
tell the media what not to publish? In what circumstances, if any, can
the government engage in censorship, or, to use a fancier description,
impose "prior restraints" upon publication.
Five years ago I would have told you that in 1931, the Supreme
Court, in a case called Near v. Minnesota, 20 held unconstitutional a
state statute which authorized the issuance of injunctions against per-
sons who engaged in the business of regularly publishing a defamatory
newspaper. Chief Justice Hughes said that the principal purpose of the
first amendment was to prevent prior restraints, thereby giving con-
18. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19. See section V.
20. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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stitutional dimensions to the old English rule that equity will not
enjoin a libel. I would also have told you that an exception had been
made in the case of motion pictures. The Supreme Court held in 1961
that censorship was permissible because of the unique nature of the
medium. 2 1 But even there, the Court was creating so many procedural
and substantive safeguards that, as a practical matter, censorship of
motion pictures would soon be a thing of the past. Since that time, of
course, we have had problems with motion picture classification,
which presents constitutional problems beyond the ambit of this dis-
cussion.
If this were 1969 instead of 1974 I would also have told you about
an attempt which had been made in the middle 1960's, in New York,
to enjoin the distribution of a picture called "John Goldfarb Please
Come Home" on the ground that the privacy of Notre Dame Univer-
sity and its president, Father Theodore Hesburgh, had been invad-
ed. 22 But I would also have told you that the Goldfarb litigation had
foundered within a matter of months because of an interpretation of
New York law which was based essentially on first amendment con-
siderations.
But all this would have been five years ago. Today any discussion
of prior restraints must deal extensively with the so-called Pentagon
Papers litigation, which occurred in June of 1971, and its implications
for the future.
23
There were, as you may recall, two cases, one against the New
York Times and the other against the Washington Post. I was deeply
involved in the Post case and will concentrate my personal comments
on it. You may recall that on June 13, 1971, the New York Times
began publication of a series of articles based upon a forty-seven
volume history of United States foreign policy in Vietnam. This study
covered the period from 1945 to March 1968, and was therefore more
than three years old at the time of litigation.
As we were told, these forty-seven volumes had been classified
"top secret-sensitive." We were later to learn that there was, in fact,
no such official classification. The highest level of classification was
top secret and it was applicable only to documents which were so
secret that unauthorized disclosure could lead to exceptionally grave
damage to the nation, such as a definite break in diplomatic relations
affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against the
United States or its allies, a war, or the compromise of information
vital to the national defense.
Well, it turned out that much of this material consisted of clip-
21. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
22. University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207
N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832, aff'g, 22 App. Div. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965).
23. New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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pings from newspapers such as the New York Times, texts of various
presidential addresses and other similar information. It also developed
that much of the information was already in the public domain.
I remember scanning the first article or two in the New York
Times, when I had no idea that I would ever have a professional
interest in any of this. To me it looked like history. To be sure, it
appeared to portray our government as something less than candid
with the American people. But nothing in what I read, suggested that
the publication of the material was likely to cause anything more than
embarrassment, and that mostly to President Nixon's political oppo-
nents. The government, however, took a different view.
The Justice Department filed suit two days after the initial publi-
cation and, for the first time in the 182-year history of the Republic,
asked a court to stop the presses. On Friday, June 18, the Washington
Post began publication of a series based on some of the same docu-
ments. This time the government moved more quickly. By nightfall it
had filed a suit against the Washington Post in the District of Colum-
bia. By this time, it was obvious to everyone, except possibly to the
government, that its actions had created a grave constitutional confron-
tation. The courts reacted with lightning speed, although interim
restraints by court order throughout the litigation effectively barred
publication. In exactly eight days the New York Times case arrived in the
United States Supreme Court, having been through the district court and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Washington Post case
moved even more quickly. It arrived in the Supreme Court less than a
week after it had been filed, having gone through an application for a
temporary restraining order, an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit; the granting of a restraining order in the
middle of the night by a hastily convened panel of the court of appeals; a
remand for the taking of testimony on the government's application for
preliminary injunction; an appeal from the denial of the application after
hearing; an affirmance of the denial by the court of appeals and a denial of
a motion for reargument in the court of appeals.
We learned on the afternoon of Friday, June 25, 1971, that the
two cases would be heard in the Supreme Court the following morn-
ing, June 26, at 11 A.M. and we were directed to file our brief on the
merits by 9 A.M. The brief that was filed on behalf of the Washington
Post was written between approximately 3:30 P.M. on Friday, June 25
and 5 A.M., June 26. It was reproduced, served and filed between 5
and 9 A.M.
One of the most difficult problems about the case, apart from the
pressures of time, was the fact that no one seemed to know the exact
basis on which the government was attempting to obtain the injunc-
tion; nor could anyone determine what legal standard should be
applied in such a situation. The government itself kept changing its
theories as the cases proceeded through the courts.
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The closest we came to any guidance on the subject was the order
filed by the court of appeals on June 19, 1971. That order directed the
district court to determine whether publication of material "would so
prejudice the defense interests of the United States or result in such
irreparable injury to the United States as would justify restraining the
publication thereof."
The only authority cited for this test was Near v. Minnesota.24 In
that case, Chief Justice Hughes had said by way of dictim:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right. . . . No one would question but that a government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or
the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops.
2 5
I am aware of the fact that members of academia and others have
criticized those who briefed and argued this case in the Supreme Court
because none of us urged adoption of a rule which would prohibit
prior restraints, even in circumstances such as those suggested by
Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota. I don't think I should
attempt to explain the position of the New York Times, but I would
like to tell you something of what went into our own thinking.
In the first place we did not need an absolute ban on prior
restraints to win the case. The district court had found, after an
evidentiary hearing, that the only danger involved in publication was
the embarrassment which the United States would suffer in attempting
to explain to foreign governments why the United States government
could not censor its press. We did not think that any court in this
country would be prepared to support a prior restraint on this basis.
Second, the court of appeals had also found, by a lopsided major-
ity, that the government had failed to meet the Near test. This in-
cluded the two appellate judges who, only a few days earlier, had
remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on the preliminary
injunction issue.
Third, we knew from the Supreme Court memorandum setting
the case for argument that four of the nine justices (Black, Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall), would almost certainly hold that there was no
basis for continuing the restraint which had been in effect during the
pendency of the litigation, and we did not wish to take a position
which might conceivably alienate the critical fifth vote we needed to
win. After all, unless you accept the position of Justices Black and
24. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
25. Id. at 716.
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Douglas, it's pretty hard to argue that papers can publish the sailing
dates of troopships and the number and location of troop positions.
Finally, we knew that Justices Black and Douglas had long been
advocates of the absolute position with respect to the first amendment.
We also knew that these two eminent Justices had never convinced
any of their brethren of the correctness of their views. We believed that
Justices Black and Douglas would almost certainly continue to urge that
view on their brethren in this case. We were of the view that if Justices
Black and Douglas were unable, over a period of several decades, to
convince their brethren that the first amendment was absolute, we
certainly would not be able to devise a series of arguments which would
do so between 3:30 P.M. Friday and 5 A.M. Saturday morning.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court on the morning of
June 26. The decision was rendered four days later, June 30, 1971.
Believe it or not, in a court having but nine members, we had ten
opinions: an unsigned per curiam opinion, and separate opinions by
each of the nine members of the Court. The final vote was 6 to 3
against the government. The separate concurring and dissenting opin-
ions touch on a wide range of issues. It is perhaps fitting that Mr.
Justice Black's opinion in this historic case was to be the last opinion that
great jurist rendered. It could well stand as a monument to his life and to
his constitutional philosophy. In his opinion, Mr. Justice Black pro-
claimed in ringing terms the supremacy, of the first amendment and the
unique role of the press in keeping the government honest. Other
opinions deal with various aspects of the Espionage Act, the question of
whether even temporary restraints should be granted in similar cases in
the future, and complaints about the speed with which the court was
forced to render its decision.
The per curiam opinion, the only one on which a majority of the
Court could agree, stated simply that any system of prior restraints
carried with it a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity;
that the government thus carried a heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion for the imposition of such a restraint; and that the government
had failed to meet that burden.
But what is that burden? And against what standard is it to be
measured? Is it the grave and irreparable injury test suggested by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit? On all this, the
per curiam opinion is silent.
Certain things do emerge from the litigation, even though they are
not clearly articulated in the opinions. First, it seemed clear that a
security classification by the government does not, of itself, permit the
government to obtain an injunction against publication. At the outset
of the litigation, the government asserted that the courts had no right
to second-guess the executive, but that argument was substantially
abandoned by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.
Second, it is equally clear that a majority of the Supreme Court
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did not attribute controlling significance to the argument that the
documents in question may originally have been copied illegally or
improperly by the person or persons who turned them over to the New
York Times and the Washington Post.
Third, at least so far as some of the Justices were concerned, the
possibility that publication of the material might violate a criminal
statute did not justify the issuance of an injunction to preclude its
publication.
Fourth, mere embarrassment to the government in the conduct of
foreign affairs did not provide a sufficient basis for the granting of an
injunction against publication.
Fifth, the government's argument that its right to obtain an
injunction was based upon the President's power as commander-in-
chief of the armed forces and his responsibility in the conduct of
foreign relations, did not persuade a majority of the Court.
But the most significant fact that emerges from this judicial pot-
pourri is the fact that the government, in fact, failed in its attempt to
stop the presses, except for a relatively short period of time. This, in
itself, was no mean achievement. I think that in the future, the
government will think long and hard before it again rushes off to court
to seek injunctive relief to prevent publication of political material in the
hands of the media.
Finally, I would like to talk about something that pervaded the
whole case and which, in my view at least, has very serious implica-
tions for freedom, even though it also has its amusing aspects. I am
talking about the aura of secrecy with which the government sought to
invest the litigation. At an early stage in the Washington Post case, for
example, the government suggested to the district court that it had
evidence which was so secret that even defense counsel could not look
at it. The court said that, if defense counsel could not look at it, it did
not want to look at it either, and that was the end of that. Also, there
was a secret evidentiary hearing in the district court and a secret
argument in the court of appeals. During the open hearing in the
district court, the government objected to the presence of the defen-
dants during the secret proceedings. Judge Gesell overruled that objec-
tion and the Republic did not collapse.
At the opening of the public hearing in the district court, one of
those sitting at the counsel table to assist the Washington Post was
none other than Roswell Gilpatric, who had held extremely sensitive
positions in the Defense Department. Counsel for the government
briefly objected to Mr. Gilpatric's presence on the ground that he did
not have the necessary security clearance. This argument was quickly
abandoned.
Thus, in the interests of national security, the government was
prepared not only to stop the presses in contravention of the first
amendment, but to deny the defendants their right to counsel and
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advice and to confront the witnesses against them, in contravention of
almost every principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence in which we have
been taught to believe, not to mention a series of constitutional protec-
tions. But I suppose we should not have been too surprised that the
Defense Department did not want to trust defendants and their coun-
sel. It had already been reviewing this forty-seven volume tome for
three years to decide whether it was safe to let Senator Fulbright see it.
He was only chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but
the Department decided they could not show the history to him because
it was too sensitive.
Finally, to illustrate just how infectious these claims of secrecy
can be, I come to a rather bizarre incident that occurred just before the
argument of the appeal in the United States Supreme Court. Shortly
before 11 A.M., counsel who were to actually argue the appeal were
informed by one of the Supreme Court clerks that the Court had voted
6-3 against allowing a government request for a secret argument in the
Supreme Court, but that the Court's decision with respect to that
motion must itself be kept secret, even from the defendants. A few
minutes later the Court convened and, as the first order of business,
the Chief Justice announced that the government's motion for an
in camera hearing had been denied by a vote of 6 to 3. Even if
disclosure of the Pentagon Papers could have led to an atomic war, it
is difficult to see why the denial of a government request for an
in camera argument should have been kept secret from anyone.
The Pentagon Papers litigation is now, happily, concluded, but
issuance of prior restraints unfortunately are not. Since the Pentagon
Papers decision we have begun to see a proliferation of cases in which
courts seem to be willing to issue injunctions against publication of
material.
For example, the courts are increasingly issuing gag-orders
against reporters to preclude publication of information which, in the
court's view, might prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. 26 This
problem is compounded by the fact that, even if an injunction is later
held to be invalid, at least one court has held that it must nevertheless
be obeyed, on pain of contempt, until it is vacated.
2
1
As a second example, a former CIA agent was recently enjoined
from disclosing classified information in a book which he had writ-
ten. 28 In that particular case, the agent had signed an oath promising
not to disclose information about the CIA which he learned in the
26. See, e.g., Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444, modified, 30 N.Y.2d
171, 282 N.E.2d306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407(1972); State v. Rose, 271 So. 2d483(Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).See
also Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc., v. Berry, 206 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1974) (holding that the trial
court's bar of access to pleadings for 21 days following filing was unauthorized by statute).
27. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979
(1973); compare State v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971) with Oliver v. Postel, 37
App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1972) (dictum).
28. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S 1063 (1972).
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course of his employment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
specifically stated that by signing the oath, the agent had not surren-
dered his first amendment right to free speech and that the court
would decline on first amendment grounds to enforce the oath to the
extent that it purported to prevent disclosing non-classified informa-
tion. In the very next sentence, however, the court held that the agent
could not disclose classified information obtained in the course of his
employment which was not already in the public domain. I will leave
it to you to figure out what all this means in terms of first amendment
freedoms.
Another instance involves the issuance of an injunction against
circulation of a book because the author, who was a psychiatrist,
disclosed information which he had received in a professional capac-
ity. 29 That case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court -and will be
heard in the October term.
Late last year, a trial court in Indiana issued an injunction against
a television news documentary showing that plaintiff manufactured
baby cribs which were flammable. Plaintiff claimed it has been libeled
because the actual crib-burning took about ten minutes whereas in the
television documentary it took about 40 seconds. That injunction has
since been vacated.
30
Finally, I would just mention briefly a decision, about a year old,
in which the United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld a
Pennsylvania state court decision enjoining the continuation of clas-
sified advertisement columns designated "male interest" and "female
interest. ' '3' The Court acted even though the paper advised its readers
that employers were not permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex
and that the designation was based only on probable areas of employee
interest.
The increasing willingness of courts to grant such injunctions, on
whatever theory and for whatever purpose, is disturbing. In each case,
of course, there appeared to be some social interest which the injunc-
tion would serve. But where do you stop?
Governments can always find or manufacture sound reasons why
a particular piece of information should be suppressed. Frankly, I do
not like to see courts get into the habit of acting as judicial censors. It
would be a sorry day for this country if some American writer were
someday to echo these words which Leo Tolstoy once wrote:
You would not believe how, from the very commence-
ment of my activity, that horrible censor question has tor-
29. Doe v. Roe, 42 App. Div. 2d 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1973), aff'd 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307
N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1974) (without opinion), on rehearing 34 N.Y.2d 562, 310
N.E.2d 539, 354 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1974), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 420 U.S. 307 (1975).
30. American Broadcasting Companies v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 312 N.E.2d 85 (Ind. 1st
Dist. 1974).
31. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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mented me; I wanted to write what I felt; but at the same
time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be
permitted, and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I
abandoned, and went on abandoning, and meanwhile the
years passed away.
32
32. Quoted in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 66, n.6 (1961) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
